Defense of the Civilly Disobedient by Greenblatt, Deborah
North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 13
Number 2 Volume 13, Number 2 Article 3
4-1-1982
Defense of the Civilly Disobedient
Deborah Greenblatt
Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Greenblatt, Deborah (1982) "Defense of the Civilly Disobedient," North Carolina Central Law Review: Vol. 13 : No. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol13/iss2/3
DEFENSE OF THE CIVILLY DISOBEDIENT
DEBORAH GREENBLATT*
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 158
I. WHAT IS CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  159
A. Toward a Definition ................................. 159
B. History of Civil Disobedience ........................ 162
C. Justification of Civil Disobedience ................... 164
II. TAKING THE CASE ........................................ 167
A. D efining G oals ....................................... 167
B. Interview ing .......................................... 167
C. Choosing a Lawyer .................................. 169
D. A Word About Money ............................... 171
E. Alternative Roles ...................................... 171
F. Pre-Arrest Advice .................................... 172
G . G roups ............................................... 173
H. Deciding on a Defense Approach .................... 174
I. Planning for Trial .................................... 176
J. Dealing with the Press ............................... 177
III. D EFENSES ................................................. 178
A. Technical and Traditional Defenses .................. 178
B. The Necessity Defense ............................... 181
C. The International Law Defense ...................... 184
D. First Amendment Defenses ........................... 184
E. Contempt of Court ................................... 188
IV. OF JURIES AND LAWYERS ................................. 189
A. Jury Nullification: The Law and the Controversy .... 189
B. Jury Nullification: What to do ....................... 192
CONCLUSION ...................................................... 193
INTRODUCTION
This essay is written for lawyers undertaking the representation of
people who have committed civil disobedience. There is no attempt
here to cover basic trial or criminal defense skills, but rather to guide
the lawyer in a specific set of cases-those involving civil disobedience.
* Litigation Director, Carolina Legal Assistance for the Mentally Handicapped, Raleigh,
NC; B.A. Douglas College of Rutgers Univ., 1968; J.D. cum laude, North Carolina Central Univ.,
1972; LL.M., Duke Univ., 1980; Private Practitioner, Raleigh, NC, 1972-1978.
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DEFENSE OF CIVILL Y DISOBEDIENT
The civilly disobedient client is distinctive from other clients facing
criminal charges in many ways. This defendant does not deny violat-
ing the law. Rather, the violation is not only admitted, but frequently
planned in advance, discussed, and publicized. What can a lawyer do
for such a client? How does defense of civil disobedience differ from
other criminal cases? How is it similar? Does civil disobedience imply
a plea of guilty and willing acceptance of punishment? These are
among the questions which will be addressed with a view toward aid-
ing the lawyer in understanding civil disobedience, facilitating law-
yer/client communication and decision-making, and providing
thorough, competent representation.
I. WHAT IS CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE?
A. Toward a Definition
Effective representation, and effective use of some of the strategies
discussed in this article must begin with a basic understanding of what
civil disobedience is, its justification, and its historical role in Anglo-
American jurisprudence.
Civil disobedience is defined by philosopher John Rawls as " [a]
public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usu-
ally done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies
of the government."'
This broad definition encompasses a wide range of activity. It is not
limited to direct civil disobedience-that is, action in which the law
being violated is the very subject of the protest. It also includes viola-
tions of laws to focus public attention on other injustices in society that
may or may not be related to the laws violated-indirect civil
disobedience.2
Examples of direct civil disobedience include refusing to report for
induction into the armed services,3 burning selective service cards4 or
refusing to carry them,5 destroying records,6 refusing to pay war tax,7
and violating restrictive parade ordinances.' Direct civil disobedience
may be personal or political. For example, an act could be entirely
1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 364 (1971).
2. M. SIBLEY, THE OBLIGATION TO DISOBEY: CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW 80-81 (1970).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
4. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Eppinette, 488 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1973).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974). In Snider, defendant
claimed three billion dependents on his tax withholding as a form of protest against the Vietnam
War. He also failed to rise for the entrance and departure of the presiding judge and was cited for
contempt of court. Id at 648.
8. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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conscientious, such as the refusal of a Jehovah's Witness to report for
military duty on personal moral and religious grounds. In such a case,
the disobedient's motivation is to conform to the commands of Jeho-
vah, with little regard for the political or social consequences of his act.
Since refusal to report will have political consequences nonetheless, it
can be classified as political for purposes of definition. Direct civil dis-
obedience also includes acts that are, though conscientious, primarily
motivated to change public opinion and official policy.
Examples of indirect civil disobedience include sitting-in at segre-
gated lunch counters to protest racial discrimination,9 blocking traffic
to call attention to a municipality's discriminatory hiring practices, 0 or
sitting in at the headquarters of a public utility to protest nuclear
power." In each of these cases the law violated is not the subject of the
protest. To the extent that draft resistance, including destruction of
selective service records, protested the Vietnam War as well as the
draft, it contained elements of both direct and indirect civil disobedi-
ence. In practice, there is often overlap between personal/political
motivations and between direct/indirect methods. These distinctions
have been the subject of debate-some writers urging that indirect civil
disobedience cannot be classified as civil disobedience at all.'I Accord-
ing to the more generally accepted view,' 3 adopted for purposes of this
discussion, the definition of civil disobedience includes personal and
political acts, direct and indirect violations.
Civil disobedience can be solitary, as that of Henry David Thoreau,
or it can involve mass resistance according to common design, such as
that led by Gandhi in South Africa and India or Martin Luther King
and others during the American civil rights movements of the nineteen
sixties. It is generally public, but there are exceptions. For example,
resistance to fugitive slave laws or harboring Jews in Europe, by the
nature of the activity, required secrecy. It is generally nonviolent, but
the line between nonviolence and violence can be thin. For example, is
nonviolent activity that provokes violence by others still nonviolent?
At least one writer has defined civil disobedience as "the deliberate vio-
lation of law for a vital social purpose,"' 4 thus leaving that question
open. It can include destroying property and records or causing public
inconvenience by such means as blocking the entrance to a building.
9. See, e.g., State v. Avent, 253 N.C. 580, 118 S.E.2d 47 (1961).
10. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
11. See, e.g., State v. Birkhead, 48 N.C. App. 575, 269 S.E.2d 314, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 528,
273 S.E.2d 455 (1980).
12. See, e.g., A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968).
13. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975); J. RAWLS, supra note 1; M.
SIBLEY, supra note 2.
14. H. ZINN, DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY: NINE FALLACIES ON LAW AND ORDER 39
(1968).
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In this discussion, civil disobedience is defined as nonviolent, and
based on an underlying commitment to human life and dignity. Soli-
tary and group action are both included in this definition.
When someone violates a law they believe to be unconstitutional or
otherwise unlawful, as well as morally wrong, the question arises
whether this is civil disobedience. Some writers exclude acts that vio-
late a law for the purpose of creating a test case. ' 5 Others take the view
that violation of an unjust law is no legal violation at all.'6 To the
extent that an action might challenge the constitutionality or validity of
a law, and at the same time protest its general unjustness, it is within
the umbrella of civil disobedience. Conduct is defined as civil disobe-
dience where those who commit it are prepared to go forward even if
the law is upheld. As with the previous distinctions, in practice there is
much overlap.
The question also arises whether someone who commits civil disobe-
dience must, by definition, willingly accept whatever punishment is
meted out. '7 However, civil disobedience does not preclude raising de-
fenses. Such legal challenges can play an important role in focusing
public attention on the underlying subject of protest, and legal proceed-
ings can function as a means of legitimizing the cause protested. Civil
disobedience pressures the society toward consistency between law and
morality. This pressure actually imposes a stabilizing force on the legal
system. 18
What makes civil disobedience civil is the context in which it takes
place. It falls far short of revolution, which Thomas Jefferson pre-
scribed as a regular medicine.' 9 Civil disobedience is not a means of
overturning a thoroughly unjust and corrupt system, for it presupposes
a duty to obey. It presupposes that the laws and policies protested de-
viate from the public conscience and that appeal can be made to that
public sense of justice. It expresses disobedience to law within the lim-
its of fidelity to law but at its outer edge.2°
Finally, civil disobedience is conscientious. It is not merely an in-
stance of doing as one pleases. It presumes that the general obligation
to obey is outweighed by a greater obligation to justice, righteousness,
or human life. The decision to disobey is made in full awareness of the
possible consequences; it is based on factual background; and it is sel-
dom made without serious misgivings and doubts. Who is to say when
15. J. RAWLS, supra note 1.
16. This is the position espoused by St. Thomas Aquinas and Lon Fuller according to M.
SIBLEY, supra note 2, at 60-65.
17. Compare A. FORTAS, supra note 12, at 10 with H. ZINN, supra note 14, at 27-32.
18. For a convincing explanation of this concept, see J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 383-84.
19. M. SIBLEY, supra note 2, at 77.
20. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 367.
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the circumstances justify civil disobedience? The individual must de-
cide for herself. The idea of conscientiousness embodies rationality,
concern for others, a need for consistency in conduct, and recognition
of both the ends to be met and the intermediate consequences.
2I
Civil disobedience has many faces. For some it may be obligatory
simply to preserve one's personal integrity. For others it may be used
as a device for social reform. It may be public and nonviolent. It may
be individual or mass, direct or indirect. It is, Gandhi declared in 1922,
"the inherent right of a citizen."
22
B. History of Civil Disobedience
Civil disobedience has existed since antiquity. So long as there have
been governments, there has been disobedience to government author-
ity based on conscience. Incidents of civil disobedience are recorded in
the Old and New Testaments and in the literature of ancient Greece
and Rome. The midwives in the second book of Moses refused to fol-
low the command of Pharoah to kill all male children born to
Hebrews. 23 The disobedience of Socrates is well known. Convicted of
impiety, he willingly accepted the punishment of death, even though
not everyone tried and convicted of this act met such an end.
24
Reports of disobedience to civil authority in the English common
law include the celebrated case of Quaker William Penn, who was
tried, along with William Mead, in 1670 for preaching unlawful assem-
bly. The case is important not only for documenting the disobedience
of Penn and Mead but primarily because the jury refused to convict
them despite strong evidence of guilt. As a result, the jury was impris-
oned by the judge for two nights without food and fined for their ver-
dict of not guilty. The jurymen's case was reviewed on writ of habeas
corpus, and Chief Justice Vaughn delivered the opinion for the Court
in Bushell's Case,25 establishing the right of juries to give their verdict
according to their convictions.26
In colonial America, similar cases occurred, one being that of John
Peter Zenger in 1735. Zenger was charged with printing and publish-
ing seditious libels, but, with an eloquent defense by Andrew Hamil-
21. For guidance in making the decision see the discussion in M. SIBLEY, supra note 2, at 115.
See also King, Letterfrom the Birmingham Jail, in NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY 461 (1966).
22. M. GHANDi, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE 174 (1972).
23. Exodus 1:15.
24. D. DAUBE, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN ANTIQUITY 72-75 (1972).
25. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670). See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 46
(1973).
26. See Scheflin, Jury Nulloflcation." The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972).
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ton, he too was acquitted.27 Meanwhile, in England, the violation of
seditious libel laws was so prevalent that debate over the jury's power
to acquit resulted in the enactment in 1792 of Fox's Libel Act. The Act
specifically provided that in seditious libel cases, as in all other criminal
cases, "the jury. . . may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty
upon the whole matter put in issue."2 That people were willing to risk
criminal prosecution in order to further the cause of freedom of the
press undoubtedly led to the incorporation of that ideal in the first
amendment of the United States Constitution.
Henry David Thoreau served a night in jail in 1846 for refusing to
pay his poll tax. His essay, "Civil Disobedience," made his position
clear: "How does it become a man to behave toward this American
government today? I answer that he cannot without disgrace be associ-
ated with it. I cannot for an instant recognize that political organiza-
tion as my government which is the slave's government also."' 29 Such
was his faith in the power of civil disobedience, that he added: "If the
alternative is to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery,
the State will not hesitate which to choose."3 °
Disobedience to the fugitive slave act of 1850 was so widespread that
a meeting in Highland County, Ohio, led by Senator Salmon P. Chase,
resolved that "disobedience to the enactment is obedience to God." In
Chicago, the Common Council adopted a resolution denouncing the
Act and forbidding city policemen to render assistance in its
enforcement.3
Of course, not all civilly disobedient defendants have been acquitted;
nor have many governments forbade their police to enforce unjust
laws. Most have been convicted and many have been sentenced to
prison. Suffragists were imprisoned in England and in the United
States as a result of their struggle for women's voting rights. In the
United States, Susan B. Anthony was prosecuted with fourteen others
for voting in the election of 1872.32 Decades later, women like Rose
Winslow and Alice Paul were sentenced to seven months in prison for
blocking traffic during a suffrage protest. In prison, they embarrassed
the national leadership with their hunger strike and the forced feedings
that accompanied it. Eventually, the nineteenth amendment was rati-
fied, giving women the right to vote.33
27. See M. KUNSTLER, THE CASE FOR COURAGE 17-45 (1962).
28. See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 25, at 47.
29. Thoreau, CivilDisobedience, in THE PACIFIST CONSCIENCE 140, 143 (1967) (emphasis in
original).
30. id at 150.
31. Sax, Conscience andAnarchy. The Prosecution of War Resisters, LVII THE YALE REVIEW
481, 482 (1968).
32. See D. WEBER, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN AMERICA 184 (1978).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. See D. WEBER, supra note 32, at 184.
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Later, hundreds of black civil rights protesters went to jail for sitting-
in at lunch counters throughout the south. The courts initially refused
to acknowledge their fourteenth amendment rights of equal protec-
tion,34 but their courage and the justice of their cause finally touched
the public conscience. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted,
prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations. Then, be-
latedly, the United States Supreme Court held that, by virtue of the
supremacy clause, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 abated all pending state
prosecutions for trespass and similar minor offenses related to the sit-
ins.
35
In 1967, nearly a thousand men were incarcerated for violating the
selective service laws. In December of 1969, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Will R. Wilson announced that the Nixon administration was
prosecuting Vietnam War resisters at twelve times the rate of its prede-
cessor. 36 With new prosecutions being initiated at the rate of 300 per
month, he noted that convictions were on the rise and that judges were
getting tougher. The average prison term for refusing induction was
then more than thirty-seven months.37 By January of 1973, the Presi-
dent declared an end to the draft, and, by the end of March of that
year, the government withdrew all United States military troops from
Vietnam. In 1977 President Carter granted conditional amnesty to Vi-
etnam era draft resisters.
C. Justification of Civil Disobedience
"The wise fools who sit in the high place of justice fail to see that in
revolutionary times vital issues are settled not by statutes, decrees and
authorities, but in spite of them."
Helen Keller
The debate over whether and when civil disobedience is justified has
raged among philosophers and statesmen so long as there has been civil
disobedience. It has also been played out in many courtrooms. The
arguments against civil disobedience are that it tears at the fabric of our
society and injures it unnecessarily; that it fosters general lawlessness;
that it encourages people to think that they can choose which laws to
obey and which to break; that it provokes violence; that it undermines
the proposition that we are a government of laws and not of men; that
there are alternative means to accomplish the goals sought; and that
34. See, e.g., State v. Avent, 253 N.C. 580, 118 S.E.2d 47 (1961).
35. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
36. J. MITFORD, Preface to THE TRIAL OF DR. SPOCK (1970); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 93
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 140-49 (1972).
37. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 36.
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civil disobedience leads to revolution, chaos, and anarchy.38 Essays jus-
tifying civil disobedience have been written by its most reknowned
practitioners, among them Henry David Thoreau, Mohandas K. Gan-
dhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr.39 The subject has also been addressed
by philosophers, political scientists, and legal scholars.
4 0
It is important for the lawyer who represents a civilly disobedient
defendant to understand the justifications of civil disobedience. Two
principles are basic: the government exists by the consent of the gov-
erned; and the law does not contain moral or divine force of its own.
Given these principles, it is easy to see that there is opportunity for law
and morality to contradict each other. Slavery presents an obvious ex-
ample. Laws upholding or requiring participation in racial discrimina-
tion, war, military conscription, capital punishment, and nuclear arms
production have equal potential. Hitler's rise to power and extermina-
tion of the Jews in Germany was totally legal. Yet even Abe Fortas, in
his attack on civil disobedience, acknowledges that he hopes, had he
lived in Hitler's Germany, that he would have refused to wear an
armband.4 i
Where morally offensive conduct is protected by law, a dilemma is
cast before he who opposes it. Is it sufficient to protest legally by peti-
tioning the government to change its ways? History has shown that it
often is not. In virtually every case of justified civil disobedience, nor-
mal appeals to political forums have already been made and failed, and
legal means of redress have proved to no avail. However, it is not nec-
essary that such legal means be exhausted in order to justify civil diso-
bedience when a reasonable decision has been made that further
attempts would be fruitless. There is a time when society needs not
only to be addressed by reason but also touched by emotion. Thus,
Martin Luther King in his "Letter from the Birmingham Jail" re-
sponded to the question of why he chose direct action rather than nego-
tiation. "You are exactly right in your call for negotiation. Indeed, this
is the very purpose of direct action. Nonviolent direct action seeks to
create such a crisis and establish such creative tension that a commu-
nity that has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the
issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be
ignored."42
For the religious disobedient, the distinction is clear-cut. If the law
38. See, e.g., A. FORTAS, supra note 12; Storing, The Case Against Civil Disobedience, in ON
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1969).
39. See M. GANDHI, supra note 22; King, supra note 21; Thoreau, supra note 29.
40. Eg., A. BICKEL, supra note 13; J. RAWLS, supra note 1; Sax, supra note 31. See also C.
COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1971).
41. A. FORTAS, supra note 12, at 18.
42. King, supra note 21, at 465.
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of the state contradicts the dictate of God, obedience to God supersedes
civil law. But disobedience need not be religious to be conscientious, so
long as it appeals to the moral basis of civil life and the community's
sense of justice.
As for concern that civil disobedience is harmful to the society and
the legal system, surely one would not advocate a society in which ac-
quiescence to injustice prevails. As Mulford Sibley has stated:
We disobey because we have concluded that disobedience will enhance
righteousness; but a part of the righteousness we endeavor to preserve is
respect for the law. Although it has been maintained by some that the
civilly disobedient do not have this respect, it can plausibly be argued
that they demonstrate greater veneration for law than those who obey
mechanically and without thought; for the latter, in grounding their
conformity on uncriticized habit, appear to take the purposes and
means of law with less seriousness than the conscientiously disobedient.
It is somewhat like automatically agreeing with everything a certain
person may say: we show far less respect for his mind and soul under
such circumstances than if we listen carefully, weigh his words, and,
when conscientiously compelled to do so, express vigorous dissent.43
Passive acquiescence and apathetic obedience could well be greater
sources of violence and disturbance in the long run than either active
obedience or civil disobedience. A society that aspires to freedom and
democracy requires an active, participating citizenry. Civil disobedi-
ence creates an opportunity for dialogue between the controlling au-
thority and citizens. It raises questions concerning the effectiveness,
utility, and rightness of laws and institutions. It teaches. 44 Through
civil disobedience, one can say "No" to the inherent question posed by
the unjust law, while continuing efforts toward mutual understanding.
As for the proposition that we must preserve a government of law
rather than of men, lawyers need only be reminded that in the criminal
justice system we are very much a government of men. Discretion ex-
ists at every step of the process. It occurs at the arrest level when a state
official, stopped for speeding, is given a warning, while others are tick-
eted. Discretion is found in the office of the magistrate who refuses to
issue an assault warrant in a domestic dispute or when an arrestee com-
plains of police brutality on the part of an arresting officer.
Prosecutorial discretion is recognized as essential to the flow of crimi-
nal dockets. We rely on the judgment of prosecutors and welcome
their restraint where strict enforcement of the laws might produce un-
just results. Plea-bargaining is accepted as part of our legal system. It
is acknowledged that acquittal often depends more on the quality of
legal counsel (and the pocketbook of the accused) than on the state of
43. M. SIBLEY, supra note 2, at 94.
44. A. BICKEL, supra note 13, at 94.
9
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the law. That we are indeed a government of men with all the frailties
and weaknesses of mankind was one of the lessons of Watergate.
In the words of philosopher John Rawls, "if justified civil disobedi-
ence seems to threaten civic concord, the responsibility falls not upon
those who protest but upon those whose abuse of authority and power
justifies such opposition. For to employ the coercive apparatus of the
state in order to maintain manifestly unjust institutions is itself a form
of illegitimate force that men in due course have a right to resist."4 5
That law and morality can diverge was recognized by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Seeger' where the Court quoted with ap-
proval the statement of Chief Justice Hughes that, "[in the forum of
conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the State has always
been maintained.
47
II. TAKING THE CASE
Said Alice, "Would you tell me please which way I ought to go from
here?"
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the cat.48
A. Defining Goals
In the usual criminal defense case, the lawyer is either appointed or
retained, and there is generally no doubt that a verdict of not guilty is
the primary goal of both lawyer and client. If acquittal cannot be
achieved, the secondary goals of lesser offense and lighter sentence are
sought through available means. Where the defendant has committed
civil disobedience, however, the goal of acquittal is not always primary
and may be far down the defendant's list of priorities. This departure
from the general goals of criminal cases can cause grave misunder-
standings between lawyer and client and problems at every stage of the
defense. It is therefore essential that the lawyer and client reach a mu-
tual understanding from the beginning about the goals and purposes of
the defense. These goals should be clearly articulated and ranked ac-
cording to priority. They can then serve as the basis for decisions
throughout the case.
B. Interviewing
Interviewing skills are always important for the litigating attorney.
45. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 391.
46. 380 U.S. 163 (1964).
47. Id at 169 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931)).
48. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 89.
10
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The client-centered approach advocated by Binder and Price4 9 is read-
ily applicable to interviewing and counseling civilly disobedient clients.
The interviewing skills suggested by Binder and Price are designed to
facilitate communication and to gather information through question-
ing. A civilly disobedient client may tend to view the lawyer as a pa-
rental or authority figure, thus expecting the lawyer to be judgmental
towards her. This role expectation would obviously interfere with good
lawyer-client communication. Binder and Price label the psychological
factors that may cause a client to be less communicative with his attor-
ney "inhibitors."5 Inhibitors may include the client's belief or training
about authority, human nature, and appropriate behavior or values.
Factors that tend to motivate full participation in attorney-client com-
munications are called "facilitators." Positive, non-judgmental listen-
ing and feedback to the client operate as facilitators, indicating that the
lawyer understands what the client is saying and wants to hear more.51
This can be particularly helpful in overcoming perceived irrelevance
where the client, preoccupied with the underlying social issue, under-
values the importance of factual details related to the elements of the
crime.
Listening skills are helpful "not simply to insure that the lawyer
hears and understands what has occurred, but also to provide the client
with the motivation for full and complete communication."5 " Listening
techniques include silence, open-ended questions, non-committal ac-
knowledgments and observation of nonverbal expression by the client.
The interviewer should generally ask open-ended as opposed to leading
questions followed by narrower questions to elicit detail.53
Listening and communication skills can be especially helpful in the
civil disobedience context where clients tend to be skeptical of author-
ity. The civilly disobedient defendant is likely to have studied and dis-
cussed not only the underlying issue giving rise to the action (e.g.,
nuclear power, the draft, the arms race), but also will have read and
thought about the subject of civil disobedience itself. The conventional
idea that the lawyer plays the dominant role with a "trust me" ap-
proach to the client simply will not work in this context. Most civilly
disobedient defendants expect to know everything possible about the
law, the courts, and the prospects for the case. The lawyer who accepts
a case involving civil disobedience thus takes on the task of education
49. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT CENTERED
APPROACH (1977).
50. Id. at 10-13.
51. Id at 14-17.
52. Id at 21.
53. See id at 40-47 for a full discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of various forms
of questioning.
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as well and should be prepared to explain legal issues articulately. This
two-way communication between lawyer and client will be fueled by
mutual respect and the good listening and counseling skills of the
lawyer.
The format of the interview is another important factor. Binder and
Price suggest a three-stage interviewing process: preliminary problem
identification; chronological overview; and theory development and
verification.14 This three-staged interview will serve to avoid the pitfall
of jumping into a theory of the case without having all the necessary
information. It is not uncommon for lawyers to analyze or diagnose a
case prematurely. Initial facts related by the client are reminiscent of a
similar case, a theory comes to mind and lawyers assume that they
know what relief the client desires. The problems of this approach are
evident. In making a premature analysis, the lawyer may not only
jump to a faulty conclusion, but relevant information and alternate the-
ories are lost in the shuffle. The three-staged interview avoids this
problem by providing that the lawyer gets all of the relevant informa-
tion before pursuing a theory of the case.
C. Choosing a Lawyer
It is quite likely that at the initial interview, the client will not have
decided whether to defend her casepro se55 or to be represented by a
lawyer. One court guide for the civilly disobedient suggests four op-
tions: "1) get a traditional lawyer, 2) be formally represented by a
movement lawyer, 3) find a sympathetic, movement lawyer who will
advise you informally, or 4) try your own case."56 Another possibility
is that the defendant may defend herselfpro se but retain an attorney
for advice and guidance at trial.57
Depending on the circumstances, these options exist from the law-
yer's perspective as well. The lawyer can formally represent the client,
informally advise her, or help the client reach a decision to appearpro
se. There are advantages and disadvantages to any choice, and the
decision is naturally related to the initial decision about goals. One
writer has suggested that pro se representation is preferable where the
defendant desires to de-emphasize the goal of avoiding conviction in
54. Id at 53-54.
55. The sixth amendment guarantees defendants a constitutional right to defend pro se.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). See also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
56. W. DURLAND, CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW: A COURT GUIDE FOR THE CIVILLY DISOBE-
DIENT 49 (1980).
57. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1982], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol13/iss2/3
170 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
favor of using the trial as an occasion for fully political purposes.
58 If
the lawyer and client cannot agree on a defense strategy or the client
adopts a position of non-cooperation toward the court,pro se represen-
tation would clearly be appropriate. Of course, defendants and their
lawyers can choose to wage a political/legal defense designed to both
refute the charges and introduce political or moral issues. Advantages
of lawyer representation in such cases have been recognized. Steven
Barkan, who prefers thepro se approach, has said:
Defense attorneys possess knowledge and skills which will often be use-
ful in either kind of defense. They may make effective legal and polit-
ical points through adept questioning of witnesses and in opening and
closing statements to the jury, even though the judge gives them re-
stricted freedom in doing so. They are often especially helpful in se-
lecting a jury, in filing motions before and during the trial, and in
requesting that the judge include certain instructions in his charge to
the jury.5
Where lawyer and client agree to a political/legal defense, the presence
of the lawyer can have a depoliticizing effect. As an officer of the court,
the lawyer is expected to conform to the institutional routine of the
courtroom and tends to do so automatically. The training and skills of
the lawyer reinforce traditionally defined ways of conducting a defense
and the attorney's power to deviate from procedure is much more lim-
ited than that of apro se defendant.6' Conversely, advantages topro se
representation are that the defendant may address the jury directly, not
only during the testimony but also in the voir dire, opening statement,
and closing argument. The professional ignorance of the pro se de-
fendant can become an asset resulting in far greater latitude on eviden-
tiary matters than is granted to an attorney. This posture by a trial
judge may be accompanied by sympathy of the lay jury for the defend-
ant and may result in the prosecutor pursuing procedural and eviden-
tiary arguments less vigorously for fear of alienating the jury.6
The pros and cons of lawyer representation should be discussed
openly with the client before a final decision is made regarding the
level of representation, if any, the lawyer will provide. Facilitation of a
client's decision to appearpro se will serve both the attorney and the
defendant where that is in fact the most appropriate strategy.
58. Barkan, Political Trials and the Pro Se Defendant in the Adversary System, 24 Soc. PROBS.
324, 324 (1977).
59. Id at 326.
60. Id at 327.
61. For a fuller discussion of these points, see id at 326 and W. DURLAND, supra note 56, at
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D. A WordAbout Money
Lawyers accept civil disobedience cases for many reasons. Some-
times it is because they are committed to the cause underlying the civil
disobedience. It may be the challenge of this type of legal defense that
attracts one lawyer, while for another it may be a routine criminal de-
fense case. Where the lawyer is sympathetic to the underlying issue or
is friends with the defendant, the issue of money is difficult to confront.
The lawyer may be asked or may wish to contribute her expertise to the
cause by providing free representation. Before undertaking such a pro-
ject for the first time, an assessment should be made of the time needed,
the out-of-pocket costs anticipated, and the effects of the case on part-
ners, associates, and workflow in the office. The lawyer may desire to
contribute her services to the case but find she is unable to do so as a
practical matter. Before taking the case, the lawyer must decide what,
if any, fee will be charged. Clear communication and agreement about
the fee arrangement should be made with the client and with third-
party supporters if they will be responsible for a part of the fee. In civil
disobedience cases, it is not unusual for defendants to have a legal de-
fense fund or committee raising money for legal fees and expenses.
Sometimes parents or other third parties will be responsible. There
may be an arrangement where the client will be responsible for the
difference between what is raised and what is owed. The lawyer should
set a realistic fee from the beginning. The lawyer who sympathetically
sets a low fee at the beginning but later has to change the terms mid-
way because of time spent on the case or pressure from associates, is
doing a disservice to the client, the cause, and the lawyer-client rela-
tionship. If, because of independent means, law school employment, or
a firm which can absorbpro bono work, the lawyer is able to take the
case without a fee, costs must still be anticipated.
E. Alternative Roles
Where the defendant does not wish to have an attorney formally rep-
resent her at trial, alternative roles can be considered. For example, the
lawyer may act as "back up" counsel to informally advise a client who
will appearpro se. An indigent defendant who wishes to defendpro se
may be entitled to have "back up" counsel appointed by the court.62 If
the defendant decides to retain back up counsel, an assessment should
be made of the time and energy the case will require. There are many
tasks the lawyer may be called upon to do; among them giving pre-
arrest or pre-incident advice, discussed in the next section.
Other tasks a lawyer can do in advising pro se defendants are: to
62. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
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acquaint them with the nature of local courts and informal procedures;
to introduce them to the criminal procedure statutes; to provide infor-
mation about judges, district attorneys, and other courtroom personnel;
to introduce them to the law of evidence and recommend a handbook
or treatise on evidence in the jurisdiction; and to inform the client of
the maximum, as well as the prevailing, punishment for the crime
charged. It may be helpful to the pro se defendant to visit the court-
house to watch a trial in progress, so she will become familiar with
court proceedings.
F. Pre-Arrest Advice
Persons who intend to commit an act of civil disobedience will often
want to know about the law that is to be violated in advance of the
illegal action and may ask the lawyer to give pre-arrest or pre-incident
advice regarding the legal system, arrest procedures, bond and personal
recognizance, and jail. This kind of information can be important in
group situations where there may be some peer pressure to participate
but very little hard information about what to expect. In this situation,
the lawyer should give an overview of what the law is, how the local
courts operate, what the maximum possible punishment is, and what
the varying degrees or lesser included offenses of the crime are. The
lawyer should advise the client to be particularly observant of times
and places of the illegal action and arrest, names and badge numbers of
arresting officers, and who said what to whom. She should also explain
arrest and booking procedures including fingerprinting and photo-
graphs. The lawyer should be prepared to respond to inquiries about
constitutional defenses63 and some legal defenses such as "necessity" or
"competing harms."' It is not unusual for people who are contemplat-
ing civil disobedience (particularly when part of a group) to have an
unrealistic view of their rights. The pre-arrest meeting is an opportu-
nity for the lawyer to dispel these misconceptions and enable the client
to make an informed decision whether or not to participate. The client
should also be advised about the possibility of facing additional
charges such as resisting arrest (particularly if "going limp" is
planned), disorderly conduct, and assault on an officer.
There is a tendency among people planning civil disobedience to un-
derestimate the time and energy that legal proceedings consume.
Often, events prior to the arrest are carefully planned with little
thought for what will follow. The client should be informed regarding
how long legal proceedings are likely to last, how many court appear-
ances may be required, and how much time is necessary to plan and
63. See infra notes 112-38 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
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carry out a defense. On the other hand, the lawyer should avoid pre-
dicting specific consequences and should not answer questions to which
she does not know the answer. One of the most forgotten phrases in a
lawyer's vocabulary is "I don't know."
If the lawyer is involved with pre-arrest planning, there may be an
opportunity to attend a non-violence training session. Such a session
can educate the lawyer about non-violence theory and tactics and pro-
vide greater insight and understanding of the client than is usually pos-
sible in the lawyer-client relationship. This in turn will enable the
lawyer to better articulate the theory of non-violence at trial.
G. Groups
As indicated in Part I, some civil disobedience is by nature individ-
ual. Other cases almost always involve groups that can range from
moderately-sized to mass demonstrations. While the suggestions in this
article have been addressed to the lawyer with a single client, most ap-
ply to group situations as well. If the lawyer is representing one indi-
vidual who was arrested as part of a group and the others are also
represented, the situation is similar to representing a single client-the
primary distinction being the need to coordinate the clients' defenses.
Civilly disobedient defendants are likely to be more cooperative than
other criminal co-defendants. The nature of the conduct at issue and
the defenses available are also conducive to cooperative defense plan-
ning. While the lawyer always owes ultimate allegiance to her client,
working closely with the counsel for co-defendants can result in bene-
fits for all concerned. With the consent of the individual client, the
lawyer should meet with counsel for co-defendants to share ideas, theo-
ries, and facts. Each lawyer must determine in consultation with her
client whether there is any conflict or potential conflict of interest
among the defendants. If not, the lawyers may work together to pre-
pare the defense, dividing tasks such as pre-trial motions and briefs and
sharing work products. If the defendants are to be tried together, this
coordination will prepare the lawyers to act as a team. If the defend-
ants are to be tried separately, each client's case will benefit from team
preparation. Of course, a good working relationship among the law-
yers and clients is necessary for the success of this approach, and the
lawyer should anticipate the possibility of a future conflict. If conflicts
do arise, the lawyer should return to individual representation.
In cases where the lawyer is asked to represent an entire group or
several members of a group, different questions arise. Can the lawyer
effectively represent more than one client? Is there a conflict between
group dynamics and individual rights? The Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility permits a lawyer to represent several clients whose interests
16
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are not actually or potentially differing. In such a case, the lawyer
should explain the implications of common representation to each cli-
ent and proceed only if all clients consent.65 If, after a full and candid
discussion with the group, potential conflicts are ruled out, the lawyer
may agree to represent the entire group.
The lawyer must be aware of her responsibility to represent each in-
dividual member of the group, and must be aware of group decision-
making dynamics. The group may operate by consensus, a process
which affords individuals a veto and assures a decision that is accepta-
ble to all members of the group. Or the group may allow each individ-
ual to make his or her own decision about the case: whether to plead
guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere, and whether to have a jury or a
bench trial. But effective individual representation requires the lawyer
to ascertain that each client is afforded a sense of autonomy and self
responsibility which allows members to make different choices.
When a lawyer agrees to represent a group, she should present the
options and have the same full discussion about goals, objectives, and
defense strategies as she would with a single client. Even where there is
no conflict among the members and the group process works well, the
lawyer can expect to receive questions from individual defendants.
The lawyer should ask the group to appoint a liaison who will be
primarily responsible for communicating with the lawyer and relaying
information to the members of the group. If the lawyer is involved
with the group in a pre-arrest or pre-incident meeting, she and the
liason should prepare a checklist for each person in the group which
contains the following information: name; home address and phone
number; work address and phone number; age; sex; the name of a rela-
tive or friend; special needs; and so on.66 A similar checklist might be
valuable for defense planning and trial preparation as well.
H. Deciding on a Defense Approach
Once the decision has been made to formally represent a defendant,
attention can be turned to defense strategy. Some civilly disobedient
defendants choose not to contest the charges. While these defendants
are less likely to seek out an attorney in the first instance, they some-
times do. There are usually two reasons for the decision not to contest
the charges. For some, the commission of civil disobedience includes
submission to the penalty without contest.67 For others, the decision is
motivated by the need or desire not to cooperate with the judicial pro-
65. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 16 (as amended August, 1978).
66. Some sample checklists for nuclear station occupiers are found in THE NATIONAL No-
NUKES HANDBOOK 45-49.
67. W. DURLAND, supra note 56, at 48.
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cess at all. Still others have espoused a hybrid of these two positions.68
Some civilly disobedient defendants believe their defense should be
limited to raising the political or moral issues which were the basis of
the action. These clients are likely to prefer defenses such as necessity
or those derived from the first amendment to technical defenses involv-
ing identification or the elements of the crime. The line between tech-
nical and issue-related defenses is not always clear, however, and most
defendants are willing to intermingle technical and issue defenses so
long as they maintain the opportunity to address the reasons for their
actions.
Given that any defense of civil disobedience will include the moral
basis underlying the defendant's action, there are many reasons for in-
cluding technical defenses as well. The first is simply to put the burden
on the state to prove its case. If there are multiple defendants, each
seeking a jury trial, the prosecution may drop the charges rather than
try each case. Another reason for using all available defenses to contest
the charges is that the government will sometimes "overcharge" in
cases of civil disobedience. Most criminal codes have several degrees
of each crime. Prosecutorial or police discretion may be used to "up
the ante" by charging the defendant with a more serious degree of the
crime than the facts will support.69 Adverse special treatment is not
unusual in cases of civil disobedience. Still another reason for present-
ing technical defenses is to give the jury a hook on which to hang their
hat. There may not be the opportunity to present a justification or ne-
cessity defense to the jury. Though they may be very impressed by the
moral force of the defendant's action, juries are reluctant to disregard
the judge's instruction.7" In this circumstance the technical defense be-
comes a means by which the jury can justify an acquittal which may
actually be based on the jury's response to extralegal arguments.
As with every stage of lawyer-client planning, there should be frank
discussions about legal strategy. The goals and objectives originally
identified can be guideposts for strategy decisions. The defendant may
desire both acquittal and use of a trial as an educational and political
68. Id
69. See, e.g., State v. Birkhead, 48 N.C. App. 575, 269 S.E.2d 314, cert. denied 301 N.C. 528,
273 S.E.2d 455 (1980). In Birkhead, defendant and others entered the offices of Carolina Power
and Light Co. to protest construction of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. They were
stopped at the eleventh floor of the office building. After being asked to go to a conference room,
defendants formed a circle with interlocking arms in the hall and refused to leave until all con-
struction was stopped at the Shearon Harris plant. Defendants were arrested and charged with
forcible entry and detainer, a violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-126, rather than another offense
for which they could have been charged. Eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-134 (1981) (trespass on land
after being forbidden).
70. But see infra text accompanying notes 144-63 (discussion of the jury's right of
nullification).
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forum. Conflicts may arise where both these goals cannot be achieved.
Both lawyer and client must be prepared to make either/or decisions
when necessary. By maintaining a flexible strategy, this is possible
without disrupting the trial plan or the lawyer-client relationship.
I. Planningfor Trial
Early in the planning stages, the lawyer should have the defendant
write out a complete explanation of her reasons for committing civil
disobedience. The statement may be used in the opening or closing
arguments or as a part of her testimony at trial. This exercise will help
the client to focus and articulate her beliefs. It will also help the lawyer
to understand the defendant's action. The lawyer should inform the
client about the substantive law, the law of evidence, the custom in
local courtrooms, and the various options available to the client. The
attorney may prepare a checklist of possible trial options for the client
to consider, including: plea of guilty as charged; plea bargain; jury
trial; bench trial; trial toward acquittal, political trial, or both; possible
sentencing; and possible contempt charges.
The lawyer should keep in mind that a case involving civil disobedi-
ence may differ from previous cases. Where, for example, custom gen-
erally results in a defendant being granted a first request for
continuance, it may be denied in a civil disobedience case. Where a
conviction of trespass customarily brings a fine of $25.00, a civilly diso-
bedient defendant may receive an active sentence. At each juncture,
the lawyer should explain the various options and probabilities to the
client, keeping in mind that there are always unforeseen events. There
is a fine line between predicting probable consequences and promising
results. The lawyer should be aware of that line and not cross it.
At some point, the district attorney may offer the client an attractive
plea bargain. Like other trial and pretrial decisions, this should be ex-
plained to the client and evaluated in light of the client's goals and
objectives.7 The client should be allowed to make the final decision.
Even if she has previously rejected a plea bargain, she should be al-
lowed to consider the offer if it is remade. Depending on the stage of
preparation, the defendant may decide that the energy required to pre-
pare for trial could be better spent in another way. The lawyer should
also explain the plea of nolo contendere72 as it may be particularly ap-
propriate in civil disobedience cases where the actions themselves are
not disputed, but their culpable nature is. The client may want to enter
71. A thorough discussion of the uses and mechanics of plea bargaining in political cases is
found in J. SINK, POLITICAL TRIALS, How TO DEFEND THEM 119-39 (1974).
72. Literally translated, this Latin phrase means "I will not contest it," and is largely
equivalent to a guilty plea. A. RoSETT & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT 5 (1976).
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a creative plea other than guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere. Such a
plea could take the form of "I plead for humankind." This kind of plea
would generally be entered by the judge as a plea of not guilty.
The defendant or other defense witnesses may not wish to be sworn
in court. The lawyer should inquire about this before trial and explain
the alternative of affirmation. If any witness decides to be affirmed
rather than sworn, the lawyer should notify the court clerk in advance
of trial.
The situation may also arise where the client or witnesses and sup-
porters will refuse to stand for the judge at the opening and closing of
court. There is a religious basis for this refusal among some Quakers
who believe that no man stands above others and a person should show
deference only to God. If the lawyer knows in advance that this is
going to happen, it may be possible to arrange with court personnel for
the defendant to enter the courtroom after the judge is seated. Some
judges may not care about this ritual and avoid any confrontation
about it. However, where.the judge is offended, there is some risk of a
contempt of court charge. There are cases, however, that hold that a
religiously based or conscientious refusal to stand for a judge cannot be
the basis for criminal contempt.7 3
J. Dealing with the Press
The lawyer should prepare for the possibility that the trial may be
highly publicized. The defendant or her supporters may publicize it by
calling press conferences or demonstrations or by circulating literature.
Expert witnesses brought in for the trial may also make press appear-
ances or public speeches. The media may launch an assault on its own.
Lawyer and client should decide in advance who will be responsible for
comments to the press. The lawyer should avoid contact with the
press,74 and, if approached by reporters, she should direct them to a
press spokesperson. Lawyers and clients should remember that any-
thing said to a reporter is on the record unless specifically excluded.
The lawyer should warn the client and her supporters about possible
73. See, e.g., United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1974).
74. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-33 (as amended August, 1978),
provides:
A goal of our legal system is that each party shall have his case, criminal or civil, adjudi-
cated by an impartial tribunal. The attainment of this goal may be defeated by dissemination
of news or comments which tend to influence judge or jury. Such news or comments may
prevent prospective jurors from being impartial at the outset of the trial and may also inter-
fere with the obligation of jurors to base their verdict solely upon the evidence admitted in
the trial. The release by a lawyer of out-of-court statements regarding an anticipated or
pending trial may improperly affect the impartiality of the tribunal. For these reasons, stan-
dards for permissible and prohibited conduct of a lawyer with respect to trial publicity have
been established.
See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-107 (as amended August, 1978).
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consequences of their press statements such as contempt of court, risk
of mistrial, and use of the statements by the prosecution for impeach-
ment on cross-examination.
III. DEFENSES
A. Technical and Traditional Defenses
A wide range of defenses can be explored in a civil disobedience
case. These will vary, of course, according to the nature of the crime
charged and the jurisdiction. While most civilly disobedient defend-
ants do not deny the act which led to their arrest, the act itself may not
actually constitute the crime charged. This is particularly true where a
case has received publicity and has political implications since such a
situation often fosters overzealousness by the prosecution. Where the
defendant can show selective prosecution for political reasons such as
that designed to chill his first amendment rights, abuse of prosecutorial
discretion can serve as a defense to the charge."
As in any criminal case, the lawyer should carefully scrutinize the
indictment or other charging document. Whether the charges are filed
by citation, warrant, indictment, information, or otherwise, they must
conform to the requirements of the jurisdiction. For example, if the
defendant is charged with trespass on property owned by a public util-
ity, it may be required that the warrant identify the company by its full
corporate name in order to withstand challenge. Where there is an er-
ror of this type, the timing of an objection becomes an important con-
sideration. If the warrant is challenged before trial or before the state
closes its case in chief, the prosecution can move to amend the warrant.
Where the state fails to allege or prove a required element with the
necessary specificity before resting its case, however, the defendant's
motion to dismiss can result in the charges being dismissed.76
Another possible challenge is that of identification. Before trial, the
lawyer should move for a non-testimonial identification of the defend-
ant in a line-up. If such a procedure is unavailable, the lawyer should
move for leave for the defendant to remain seated when the case is
75. See United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Ep-
pinette, 488 F.2d 365, 370 n.l I (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.
1972).
76. In two North Carolina anti-nuclear sit-in cases, State v. Kehrer, 79 CR 2183 (N.C. Dist.
Ct., 10th J. Dist., dismissed May 15, 1979) and State v. Kaimi, 79 CR 21805 (N.C. Dist. Ct., 10th J.
Dist., dismissed May 15, 1979), the charging documents each alleged that the defendant had tres-
passed on the property of "CP & L." The cases were dismissed at the close of the state's evidence
for the prosecution's failure to charge or prove that "CP & L" was Carolinal Power and Light Co.,
a duly registered North Carolina corporation. The district attorney then brought new charges
with corrected warrants, but these were dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. State v. Kehrer,
79 CR 29717 (N.C. Dist. Ct., 10th J. Dist., dismissed July 10, 1979).
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called, so that the state's witness must identify her from all those pres-
ent in the courtroom. This challenge is likely to be more effective
where there have been multiple arrests.
While these defenses may seem far removed from the original pur-
pose of the civil disobedience, they can prove extremely valuable. This
is illustrated by the 1980 Women's Pentagon Action in which several
hundred women blocked entrances to the Pentagon. Women stationed
at two of the three entrances were arrested, while others at a third en-
trance, engaged in the same activity, were not. A total of 143 people
were arrested and charged with obstruction of an entrance, a federal
regulation violation." Of those arrested, thirty-four pleaded guilty
before federal magistrates immediately after their arrests. Of these,
twenty-nine were sentenced to ten days imprisonment and five, who
had prior convictions, received thirty days, the maximum possible sen-
tence. All were sent in leg irons to the women's federal penitentiary at
Alderson, West Virginia.7 8 Of the 110 who went to trial, several were
acquitted because they could not be identified, others were found not
guilty because of various defenses.7 9 Many were found guilty and sen-
tenced to incarceration for ten days, but by December 15, 1980, slightly
less than one month after the arrests, the United States Attorney's office
dropped all remaining charges. Approximately one-half of the 110 wo-
men who pleaded not guilty never went to trial. No reason other than
prosecutorial discretion was given for this change.80
Defenses arising from the nature of the charge, criminal procedure
statutes, and the elements of the offense vary according to the jurisdic-
tion and the particular crime charged. The opportunity for legal inge-
nuity and diligence in this area is unlimited. Statutory-based defenses
such as failure of the prosecuting witness to give the proper required
warning in a trespass case are often useful. Attacks can also be made
on the constitutionality of a statute or on its penal intent. In United
States v. Eppinette,8" a 1973 draft case, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that failure to have one's selective
service registration and classification certificates in one's possession was
not a crime. The case arose from the defendant's action during the
Vietnam war in returning his selective service cards to his draft board
with a statement protesting the war. The court's decision that the statu-
77. 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.305 (1980).
78. Accounts of the civil disobedience action and some of the cases can be found in THE NEW
YORKER, 43-46 (Dec. 9, 1980) and Ms. MAGAZINE, 17 (Sept. 1981).
79. See, e.g., United States v. King, 650 F.2d 534 (4th Cir. 1981).
80. The account of these events was related to the author in personal conversations with
attorney Nina Kraut of Washington, D.C., who defended several of the Women's Pentagon Ac-
tion defendants.
81. 488 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1973).
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tory requirement of possession was not penal was based on a legislative
history of the statute.82 This defense had been raised and rejected by at
least two prior courts,83 but the fourth circuit was undeterred.
There are some statutory-based defenses relating to the defendant's
state of mind that can serve the dual purposes of winning acquittal and
educating the jury. In many jurisdictions, one element of trespass is the
defendant's specific intent to violate the property rights of the prosecut-
ing party.84 In some states, the defendant's bona fide, reasonable belief
that she has a right to be on the property is a defense to criminal tres-
pass.85 Under either provision, the defendant may present her reasons
for being on the premises and the facts which underlie her bona fide
belief that she had a right to be there. In one of the companion North
Carolina sit-in cases, 86 the fact that the defendant owned stock in the
public utility which was the subject of the trespass resulted in her ac-
quittal on the theory that she had a bona fide belief in her right to be on
the premises for that reason.87
The issue of intent was central to the reversal of a conviction for tax
fraud where the defendants were prosecuted for claiming three billion
dependents on their W-4 form in protest of the Vietnam war.88 The
fourth circuit court of appeals held that it was not reasonable for the
Internal Revenue Service to believe the defendants intended to defraud
the government by that statement. Rather, the statement was found to
be symbolic speech protected by the first amendment.89 While the trial
judge may limit the extent of this type of evidence, at least some testi-
mony, particularly that of the defendant, is likely to be admitted where
specific intent is an element of the crime charged.9"
Finally, the concept of reasonable doubt is always a defense. From
voir dire through closing argument, the idea that the jury should not
82. Id. at 368-69. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CONG. SERV. 1989,
2008 (1948). The Court stated: " '[W]hen choice has to made between two readings of what con-
duct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to
require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite. We should not
derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication.'" 488 F.2d at 369 (quoting United
States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952).
83. E.g., United States v. Demangone, 456 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Coum-
ing, 445 F.2d 555 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 949 (1971).
84. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 810.08 - .09 (West 1976 & Supp. 1980) (willfulness is an ele-
ment of the crime of trespass).
85. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-134 (1981). See State v. Cobb, 262 N.C. 262, 136 S.E.2d 674
(1964).
86. See note 76 supra.
87. State v. Anderson, 79 CR 20375 (N.C. Dist. Ct., 10th J. Dist., May 1I, 1979).
88. United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974).
89. Id
90. In some states, trespass is a general intent crime and testimony regarding the defendant's
intent would probably be inadmissible. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(n) (1970 & Supp.
1981).
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convict unless they are convinced of a defendant's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt should be utilized by the defense for every element of
the crime and at every opportunity.
B. The Necessity Defense
The justification or necessity defense is generally the most attractive
to clients since it directly relates to the issues that compelled the de-
fendant to commit civil disobedience and opens the courtroom for ex-
planation of those issues. It provides an opportunity for the defendant
to educate the jury and judge about the subject of her protest; for exam-
ple, the dangers of nuclear power or the evils of war. The defense of
necessity can serve three purposes: political education; acquittal; and
mitigation in sentencing.
Arnolds and Garland define the defense of necessity as "the assertion
that conduct promotes some higher value than the value of literal com-
pliance with the law."'" Justification is distinguished from necessity as
being a generic term which encompasses not only necessity but also
self-defense or defense of others. As a defense to criminal charges,
necessity existed at common law and is recognized in modern English
cases.92 Necessity as a defense appeared in the Final Report of the Na-
tional Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws that simply
stated: "Except as otherwise provided, justification or excuse under
this chapter is a defense."9 3 This statement reflects some widespread
confusion between the justification defense of necessity and the excuse
defense of duress. This confusion has resulted in some courts putting
improper limitations on the defense of necessity, such as fear of serious
bodily injury or death.9 4 Arnolds and Garland point out the distinction
between justification and excuse: "[Jiustification is a circumstance
which actually exists and which makes harmful conduct proper and
non-criminal, while excuse is a circumstance which excuses the actor
from criminal liability even though the actor was technically not justi-
fied in doing what he did."95 A recent Supreme Court decision involv-
ing the defense of duress explains the distinction as follows:
Common law historically distinguished between the defenses of du-
ress and necessity. Duress was said to excuse criminal conduct where
91. Arnolds & Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law. The Right to Choose the
Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 289 (1974).
92. E.g., Moore v. Hussey, 80 Eng. Rep. 243 (1609) where Hobart, J., stated: "[A]Ii laws
admit certain cases of just excuse, when they are offended in letter, and where the offender is
under necessity, either of compulsion or inconvenience." See also, Mouse's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 63
(1608); Regina v. Bourne, I K.B. 687 (1939).
93. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT
§ 601(1) (1971).
94. See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 92, at 290 n. 18.
95. ld at 289-90.
24
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1982], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol13/iss2/3
182 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRA4L LAW JOURNAL
the actor was under an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious
bodily injury, which threat caused the actor to engage in conduct vio-
lating the literal terms of the criminal law. While the defense of duress
covered the situation where the coercion had its source in the actions of
other human beings, the defense of necessity, or choice of evils, tradi-
tionally covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor's
control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils. Thus, where A
destroyed a dike because B threatened to kill him if he did not, A
would argue that he acted under duress, whereas if A destroyed the
dike in order to protect more valuable property from flooding, A could
claim a defense of necessity. 96
It is generally recognized that there are three elements to the neces-
sity defense. One listing defines them as: (1) the act charged was done
to avoid a significant evil; (2) there were no other adequate means of
escape; and (3) the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil to be
avoided.97 The cases and literature defining the elements in this way
have turned on the substantive law of necessity. More recently, how-
ever, courts have raised the issue of whether the defendant was entitled
to present evidence of the necessity defense to the jury. These cases
have defined the elements of the defense more stringently. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Cassidy,98 the fourth circuit court of appeals
stated: "[E]ssential elements of the defense are that defendants must
have reasonably believed that their action was necessary to avoid an
imminent threatened harm, that there are no other adequate means ex-
cept those which were employed to avoid the threatened harm, and that
a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the
action and the avoidance of the harm."9 9 Cassidy and other recent
cases have upheld the trial court's refusal to permit the defendants to
offer proof to the jury on the necessity defense. too
Some courts have expressed open hostility to the justification defense
in cases of civil disobedience. In United States P. Berrigan, I" the trial
court denied the existence of any precedent for the defense and added:
No civilized nation can endure where a citizen can select what law he
would obey because of his moral or religious belief. It matters not how
worthy his motives may be. It is axiomatic that chaos would exist if an
individual were permitted to impose his beliefs upon others and invoke
justification in a court to excuse his transgression of a duly enacted
law. 102
96. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-11 (1980).
97. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 92, at 294.
98. 616 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1979).
99. Id at 102.
100. Eg., United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Simpson,
460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
101. 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968).
102. Id at 339.
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Other courts, although kinder, have reached the same result. How-
ever, there have been some incidents of success in state trial courts in
anti-nuclear cases. For example, in Lake County, Illinois, a group of
protesters who had blockaded the Commonwealth Edison Zion Nu-
clear Power Station were charged with criminal trespass. Relying on
the statutory affirmative defense of necessity,° 3 the defendants argued:
they were without blame in occasioning or developing the situation;
they reasonably believed that their conduct was necessary to avoid a
public or private injury; and the danger of public injury was greater
than the injury resulting from their conduct.'" Among the defense
witnesses was Dr. Rosalie Bertell, who testified about the effects of low-
level radiation. The defendants were all acquitted. According to Dur-
land, "The jury of six men and six women were convinced by the de-
fense argument that the Zion plant constituted a grave danger to the
surrounding community due to poor management, irresponsibility in
the area of waste disposal, and the threat of a core melt-down."' 10 5
In Elk Grove, California, a jury acquitted one of eleven defendants
for blocking an entrance to the Rancho Seco Nuclear Plant near Sacra-
mento. One defendant was convicted; the jury was unable to reach a
verdict on the other nine. The judge instructed the jury that it could
find the defendants not guilty on the ground of necessity only if the
defense proved that: (1) the defendants acted to preserve life or prop-
erty; (2) a reasonable person under similar circumstances would have
reasonably believed that the defendant's actions were necessary to pro-
tect life or property; (3) the defendants believed their actions were nec-
essary; and (4) the danger to life and property was substantial and
imminent. The jury found that the defendant who was acquitted had
exhausted every reasonable avenue of protest before engaging in the
illegal act. 'I
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
104. People v. Brown, 78 Cm 2522 (19th Dist., Lake County, Ill., discharged Feb. 1977) (De-
fendant's Memorandum in Support of the Defense of Necessity).
105. W. DURLAND, supra note 56, at 86.
106. Ogulnik, Necessity Defense Gaining Ground, N.C. ANVIL, Nov. 23, 1979, at 2.
Copies of defense memoranda and briefs from this and other cases as well as a variety of other
related legal memoranda are available for the cost of printing through the ANTI-NUKE LITIGA-
TION CLEARINGHOUSE CATALOG. The catalog lists briefs, motions, memoranda, jury instructions,
and court rulings from at least twenty-one different cases. It is available from the People's Energy
Project, 678 Massachusetts Avenue, 8th Floor, P.O. Box 125, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.
The lawyer should check local statutes and case law to determine if there is precedent for the
defense of necessity. If so, with the aid of the Clearinghouse materials, a convincing case for use
of the defense can be made.
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C. The International Law Defense
The international law defense 10 7 can be used in cases of opposition to
nuclear weaponry or other situations in which the defendant's civil dis-
obedience is directed against military combat. It is based on the propo-
sition that federal courts acknowledge international law as providing
rules for decision.' 8 The Nuremburg Charter declares planning, prep-
aration, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression to be international
crimes against peace.0 9 Similarly, in the United Nations Charter, the
United States, as well as other members of the United Nations, agreed
to refrain from the threat of or use of force in their international
relations. "o
Arguably, nuclear weaponry is aggressive rather than defensive. The
manufacture of atomic weapons and other nuclear preparedness activi-
ties would thus constitute preparation for a war of aggression in viola-
tion of the Nuremburg Charter and international law. As such, the
defendant's interference with weapons production is not criminally cul-
pable but clearly excusable as preventing a more serious legal violation.
While this defense has not met with much success to date, it is worth
raising and is the type of defense that civilly disobedient defendants
find attractive.
D. First Amendment Defenses
The first amendment"' guaranties of freedom of speech and religion
have provided only limited protection in civil disobedience cases. Stat-
utes which are designed to promote law and order, regulate traffic, safe-
guard property, and protect the administration of essential government
functions are permissible even where they have the effect of restricting
speech." 2 Regulations restricting time, place, and manner of speech as
opposed to its contents have been regarded as a reasonable exercise of
the government's police power." 3 Conspiracy statutes have also with-
stood first amendment challenges in a variety of political cases.' 4 On
107. The author is indebted to attorney Nina Kraut of Washington, D.C., whose unpublished
memorandum on the international law defense forms the basis for this section.
108. See, e.g., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900).
109. INT'L MIL. TRIB. CHARTER art. 2.
110. U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
111. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievance." U.S. CONST. amend I.
112. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
113. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
114. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). But see United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d
165 (1st Cir. 1969).
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the other hand, where a statute is arbitrarily applied or enforced, its
application to a particular case may be declared unconstitutional." 15
In situations in which criminal violations are not at issue, symbolic
speech such as the right of high school students to wear black arm
bandsI 6 or to refuse to salute the flag" 7 has been held to be protected
by the first amendment. Where conduct contains elements of both
speech and non-speech, however, the Supreme Court has held that a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element can justify incidental limitations on first amendment
freedoms."' In United States v. O'Brien,"9 the defendant publicly
burned his draft card to protest the Vietnam War. O'Brien was
charged with knowing destruction or mutilation of his selective service
registration certificate in violation of section 462(b)(3) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended in 1965.120 The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit declared the stat-
ute unconstitutional 2 ' but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
all laws necessary to the government's power to raise armies under the
1965 amendment furthered sufficiently important governmental inter-
ests. The Court stated the test in such cases as follows:
[We] think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.1 22
Under O'Brien, it is likely that most governmental regulations of
speech-conduct will be held to further governmental interests unrelated
115. 379 U.S. 536.
116. Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
117. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The language of the Court
in this case is especially eloquent. The Court stated:
There is no doubt that in connection with the pledges, the flag salute is a form of utterance.
Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas . . . . The state an-
nounces rank function and authority through crowns and maces, uniforms and black robes;
the church speaks through the Cross, the Crucifix, the alter and the shrine . . . . A person
gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort and inspira-
tion is another's jest and scorn.
Id at 632-33. The Court addressed the purpose of the first amendment: "If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein." Id. at 642.
118. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
119. Id
120. At the time O'Brien burned his draft card, an offense was committed by any person "who
forges, alters, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certificate." 50 U.S.C.
§ 462(b)(3) (1964) (amended 1965).
121. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967).
122. 391 U.S. at 377.
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to the suppression of free speech. 23
The "free exercise of religion" clause of the first amendment has tra-
ditionally been limited to protecting religious beliefs as distinguished
from religious practices. 24  However, the burden is on the state to
prove that a restriction of religious practices is justified by a compelling
state interest. 25 In recent criminal prosecutions, the issue has primar-
ily surfaced in draft cases and cases involving criminal contempt of
court. One leading case is United States v. Seeger 126 in which the de-
fendant challenged the constitutionality of section 6(j) of the Selective
Service Act' 27 and its definition of "religious training and belief". See-
ger had claimed conscientious objection to war in any form by reason
of his religious belief but was denied conscientious objector status be-
cause he would not answer "yes" or "no" to a question about his belief
in a supreme being. The court held that Seeger was entitled to an ex-
emption as a conscientious objector stating:
We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression "Supreme
Being" rather than the designation "God", was merely clarifying the
meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions
and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views.
We believe that under this construction, the test of belief "in a relation
to a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sincere and mean-
ingful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled
by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the
exemption. 121
A few years later in Welsh v. United States,129 the Court extended the
conscientious objector exemption to a defendant who objected to war
in any form but labeled his beliefs moral and ethical rather than reli-
gious. Section 60) barred from the conscientious objector exemption
all persons with "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views or a merely personal moral code." Justice Black's plurality opin-
123. But see United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974).
124. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1875).
125. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
126. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
127. Section 456() of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948 provided, in
part:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to
combatant training and service.. . who, by reason of religious training and belief, is consci-
entiously opposed to war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means
an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being ....
50 U.S.C. § 4560) (1964).
128. 380 U.S. at 165-66. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas stated he would have diffi-
culties if the statute were read differently, "[f]or then those who embraced one religious faith
rather than another would be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination, as we [have
held] would violate the Free Exercise Clause [and] would also result in a denial of equal protec-
tion by preferring some religions over others." Id at 188 (citations omitted).
129. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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ion held that the language of 6(j) should not be read "to exclude those
who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even
those whose conscientious objection to participation- in all wars is
founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public pol-
icy."' 3° The Court held that defendant Welsh was entitled to the ex-
emption even though he had struck the word "religious" on his
application. Justice Black added that section 6(j) would bar those per-
sons "whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to
war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but
instead rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or
expediency."' 3 '
In Gillette v. United States,'32 the Court refused to extend the free
exercise clause to prohibit Congress from conscripting someone who
opposed a particular war, rather than all wars, on moral and religious
grounds.
Constitutional issues must also be answered at the pre-incident stage
where the defendant intends to challenge a law by breaking it. The
question of whether a person may ignore an allegedly unconstitutional
statutory scheme and still challenge the law on constitutional grounds
has repeatedly arisen in the area of permits designed to control public
demonstrations and marches. In Lovell v. Gr4in,133 a Jehovah's Wit-
ness was prosecuted for disobeying a city ordinance that forbade the
distribution of circulars and advertising matter unless one secured a
permit from the city manager. Lovell had not applied for a license, and
the city argued that she was therefore not in the "position of having
suffered from the exercise of the arbitrary and unlimited power of
which she complains."' 34 The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by the
city's argument and held the ordinance was invalid on its face as a
prior restraint on freedom of speech. The Court held that since the
statute was constitutionally void, it was not necessary for the defendant
to apply for a permit under the statute before contesting it on constitu-
tional grounds. 35
In Poulas v. New Hampshire,'36 decided fifteen years after Lovell, de-
fendant applied for and was denied a permit to conduct religious serv-
ices in a public park. The denial of the permit was not appealed and
the defendant was arrested when the services were held without a per-
mit. The Court upheld defendant's conviction and held that since the
130. Id at 342.
131. Id. at 342-43 (emphasis added).
132. 410 U.S. 437 (1971).
133. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
134. Id at 446.
135. Id at 452.
136. 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
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ordinance was valid on its face, the proper remedy was a writ of certio-
rari to review the unlawful refusal of the city to grant the permit. Jus-
tice Reed, speaking for the Court, stated: "Delay is unfortunate, but
the expense and annoyance of litigation is a price citizens must pay for
life in an orderly society where the rights of the First Amendment have
a real and abiding meaning."'' 37
The basic distinction between these cases appears to be that if the
defendant intends to challenge a statutory scheme as unconstitutional
on its face, she may go ahead with the conduct without applying for a
permit. Of course, she takes the risk that the statute will be held consti-
tutionally valid. On the other hand, where the defendant acknowl-
edges that the statute is constitutional, but intends to challenge it as
being unconstitutionally applied, she must apply for a permit before
she can go forward with the action. If the permit is denied, defendant
can seek a determination of the constitutionality of the application of
the statute. If that is not done, and the defendant nevertheless engages
in the action, she will be deemed to have waived her constitutional
objections.
E. Contempt of Court
It is not unusual for civilly disobedient defendants to engage in activ-
ity for which they may be subject to contempt of court charges. For
example, a Quaker's refusal to stand for the trial judge may result in a
citation for contempt. Depending on the activity and the judge, con-
tempt can sometimes be avoided by a prior agreement with the
court. 138 When no advance agreement is possible, the first amendment
may provide a defense to contempt. The circuit courts of appeal, how-
ever, have split on the validity of the first amendment as a defense to
contempt charges. The seventh circuit has upheld contempt charges,
stating:
It is a general principle that contempt power is to be limited to the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed.
Appellate courts have here a special responsibility for determining
that the power is not abused, to be exercised if necessary by revising
themselves the sentences imposed. . . . The answer to those who see
in the contempt power a potential instrument of oppression lies in as-
surance of its careful use and supervision, not in imposition of artificial
limitations on the power.' 39
The fourth circuit, on the other hand, has held that the conscientious
137. Id at 409.
138. See supra text accompanying note 73.
139. In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1972); Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848 (7th Cir.
1969).
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refusal to take an oath' 4° or to stand for the judge' 4' are protected from
punishment. That court reasoned that so long as no essential element
of the judicial process is impaired by failure to comply with courtroom
formality, a defendant should not be required to violate his religious
convictions. 
42
IV. OF JURIES AND LAWYERS
A. Jury Nullfication." The Law and the Controversy
The concept of jury nullification-the jury's right to disregard the
judge's instruction on the law and acquit a defendant in the face of
compelling evidence of guilt-has been the subject of recent debate
among judges and scholars.'43 The idea of nullification is particularly
applicable to cases involving civil disobedience where appeal to the
conscience of the jury is appropriate. The Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the issue since 1895. In Sparf& Hansen v. United States,'" the
Court attempted to answer the question of whether and to what extent
juries have the right to adjudicate the law as well as the facts. The case
involved a charge of murder on the high seas. The defendants re-
quested an instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
The trial court denied the request on the grounds that the law and evi-
dence in the case did not permit a verdict on the lesser offense. The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "in the courts of the United
States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the
court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the
evidence." 45 This language has found its way into the jury instruc-
tions of many jurisdictions. 46 Although the Sparf case did not directly
address the question of jury departures from the law as given, it has
been regarded by some courts as precluding nullification. 147
140. United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1969).
141. United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974).
142. Id at 659.
143. See Christie, Lawful Departurefrom Legal Rules: Jury Nullication and Legitimized Diso-
bedience, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1289 (1974); Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullfication; The Contours of a
Controversy, 43 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1980).
144. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
145. Id at 102.
146. Eg., THE NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION FOR CRIMINAL CASES
§ 101.05 entitled Function of the Jury reads as follows:
Members of the jury: All of the evidence has been presented. It is now your duty to decide
from this evidence what the facts are. You must then apply the law which I am about to give
you to those facts. It is absolutely necessary that you understand and apply the law as I give
it to you, and not as you think it is, or as you might like it to be. This is important because
justice requires that everyone tried for the same crime be treated in the same way; and have
the same law applied to him.
147. An analysis of Spar, distinguishing that decision from the specific issue ofjury nullifica-
tion is made by Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 144 at 15-17.
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In United States v. Moylan, 48 the fourth circuit acknowledged the
power of the jury to acquit even though its verdict is contrary to the law
as given by the judge. Relying on Sparf, however, the court declined to
overrule the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury about that power.
The same result was reached by the first circuit in United States v.
Boardman.4 ' A thorough discussion of jury nullification is found in
the majority and dissenting opinions of United States v. Dougherty. 50
In Dougherty, after the history of jury nullification and acknowledging
its value to the polity, Judge Leventhal, writing for the majority, none-
theless adopted the view that jury nullification is better left to occur
spontaneously and informally, rather than as the result of incorpora-
tion in the judge's instructions.' 5'
A convincing justification for jury nullification is made by Scheflin
and Van Dyke in their paper, "Jury Nullification: Contours of a Con-
troversy."' 52 The authors examine the arguments against nullification
and effectively dispel each of them. 53 They point to the history of the
practice in Maryland and Indiana which both have constitutional pro-
visions that, in criminal cases, the jury is judge of both the law and the
facts. The courts in both of these jurisdictions have fashioned rules
governing the operation of the constitutional provision and have de-
vised jury instructions that incorporate the rule but safeguard against
abuse. For example, jurors do not have the right to declare a statute
unconstitutional and the trial judge decides all questions concerning
the admissibility of evidence. The lawyers are permitted to argue an
interpretation of the law and the judge presents an advisory
instruction. 4
The criminal defendant's right to a general verdict, a verdict of guilty
or not guilty, without further explanation, also provides support for the
jury's right to nullify the judge's instructions on the law. The relation-
ship between the general verdict and the jury's right to vote their con-
science contrary to the letter of the law is illustrated by the cases and
debate that preceded the enactment of Fox's Libel Act in England in
1792.'- More recently, in the case of United States v. Spock,"' 6 the first
148. 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
149. 419 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1969).
150. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
151. Id at 1137.
152. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 144.
153. The arguments are divided into four main categories: the "anti-anarchy" position; the
"nullification is unnecessary" position; the "nullification is unwise" position; and the "damn good
in reason" position. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 144, at 85-111.
154. Eg., Sumpter v. State, 261 Ind. 471, 480, 306 N.E.2d 95, 102 (1974), cer. denied, 425 U.S.
952 (1976); Lewise v. State, 2 Md. App. 678, 686-87, 237 A.2d 73, 78 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968); Size-
more v. State, 5 Md. App. 507, 518-19, 248 A.2d 417, 424 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968).
155. See M. KADISH & S. KADISH supra note 25, at 47. See also Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra
note 144.
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circuit court of appeals overruled the convictions of pediatrician Benja-
min Spock and others for conspiracy to aid and abet draft resisters and
for conspiracy to hinder the administration of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act. 157 Acting sua sponte, and over the objection
of the defendants, the trial court put ten special questions to the jury in
addition to the general issue of guilt. The court of appeals reversed on
the grounds that the submission of any special questions, regardless of
their content, constituted prejudicial error. Commenting on the role of
the jury in a criminal case, the court stated:
Uppermost of these considerations is the principle that the jury, as the
conscience of the community, must be permitted to look at more than
logic. Indeed, this is the principle upon which we began our discussion.
If it were otherwise there would be no more reason why a verdict
should not be directed against a defendant in a criminal case than in a
civil one. The constitutional guarantees of due process and trial by jury
require that a criminal defendant be afforded the full protection of a
jury unfettered, directly or indirectly.' 58
Thus, the argument goes, if the jury has the power to nullify, they have
the right to do so. And, having that right, they are entitled to be in-
formed of it.'59
The fear that allowing a jury nullification instruction would result in
mass jury lawlessness and acquittals was addressed by Judge Bazelon
in his dissent in United States v. Dougherty.'6 ° The defendants in that
case faced charges resulting from their interference with Dow Chemical
Company to protest Dow's manufacture of napalm used in the Viet-
nam War. Judge Bazelon distinguished the case from what he called
the "classic, exalted cases where juries historically invoked the power to
nullify.""'' He pointed out that the defendants had no quarrel with the
general validity of the law under which they were charged. Suggesting
that this distinction could and should have been explored in argument
before the jury, Judge Bazelon reflected:
If revulsion against the war in Southeast Asia has reached a point
where a jury would be unwilling to convict a defendant for commission
of the acts alleged here, we would be far better advised to ponder the
implications of that result than to spend our time devising strategems
which let us pretend that the power of nullification does not even
exist. 162
156. 416 F.2d 165 (lst Cir. 1969). An excellent account of Dr. Spock's trial is found in J.
MITFORD, THE TRIAL OF DR. SPOCK (1969).
157. 50 U.S.C. § 462(a) (1970).
158. 416 F.2d at 182.
159. See Kunstler, Dissent and the Jury, in DELIVERED INTO RESISTANCE 51 (1969).
160. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
161. Id at 1144.
162. Id
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B. Jury Nulfcation. What to do
For the lawyer who is interested in arguing nullification to the jury,
there are basically two approaches. The first is to submit a formal re-
quest for jury instructions with a proposed nullification instruction and
supporting brief to the trial judge. In the 1973 trial of the "Camden
Twenty-eight", the defendants, who were religiously motivated anti-
war activists, had destroyed records at their local draft boards. There
was no dispute that they lnad destroyed the records, but evidence later
revealed that FBI informants had been aware of the plan from an early
stage and had assisted in carrying out the act. At their trial in federal
court on charges of destroying selective service records, the trial judge
permitted the defense attorney to argue to the jury in closing, their right
to acquit if they thought the law was oppressive under the circum-
stances of the case. The judge also instructed the jury that if they
thought the participation of government agents or informers was offen-
sive to basic standards of decency and shocking to the universal sense
of justice, they could acquit any defendant to whom the defense ap-
plied. All of the defendants were acquitted. 163
There is very little case law on the subject in state courts, 164 so in
most cases the decision whether to instruct the jury on nullification will
be in the discretion of the trial judge. The options of this approach will
vary according to the jurisdiction, and the law on this question is un-
clear. It appears that in the Moylan and Dougherty cases, 65 counsel
sought permission to argue in favor of nullification as well as instruc-
tions from the judge. The court opinions, however, do not address that
issue. Thus, while there may be no right to argue nullification to the
163. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 144, at 52-53. Although the trial judge originally in-
structed the jury that they did not have the power to nullify, he later changed his mind. In his
final instructions to the jury the judge stated:
[I]f you find that overreaching participation by Government agents or informers in the activi-
ties as you have heard them was so fundamentally unfair to be offensive to the basic standards
of decency, andshocking to the universalsense ofJustice, then you may acquit any defendant to
whom the defense applies.
Transcript at 8729, United States v. Anderson, Crim. No. 602-71 (D.N.J. 1973), quotedin Scheflin
& Van Dyke, supra note 144, at 53 (emphasis added).
Portions of the defense attorney's closing argument on nullification from the trial transcript is
included in Scheflin & Van Dyke, id at 53 n.2. In addition, the brief on jury nullification in that
case is available through the Anti-Nuke Litigation Clearinghouse Catalogue. See note 107 supra.
164. Indiana and Maryland are the only states which have constitutional provisions permitting
nullification. For example, in a recent Massachusetts case, the state supreme court reversed the
conviction of a defendant where one of the jurors, on being polled, acknowledged that the evi-
dence was against the defendant but said that she could i ot convict as a matter of conscience.
Commonwealth v. Hebert, 379 Mass. 752, 400 N.E.2d 851 (1980).
165. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1969); United States v. Dougherty, 473
F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See supra text accompanying notes 149-52 & 161-63 for discussion of
these cases.
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jury in federal cases, neither is there a prohibition. The practice in
many state courts and federal districts is to allow counsel wide latitude
in closing argument so long as the evidence is not misstated. In some
jurisdictions the lawyer may read to the jury from relevant case law
even if it contradicts the law as later given by the judge. 166
The second approach is for the lawyer to informally educate the jury
about their actual power to acquit. This approach would seem to be
consistent with Judge Leventhal's majority opinion in Dougherty.t67
There are several ways the lawyer can do this. One is simply to remind
the jury about their power to acquit. The lawyer can inform the jury
that the government has no appeal from a verdict of not guilty; that the
secrecy of their deliberations is inviolable; that they are not accounta-
ble to the judge or anyone else for their verdict. This is why, they can
be told, the right to a trial by jury has been so important in our society,
why no one can be convicted of a crime without a finding of guilt by
the jury, and why the jury reflects the conscience of the community in a
way that officials cannot. The lawyer may also use history to educate
the jury about their heritage, telling in an anecdotal way about the trial
of William Penn and the jury in Bushell's Case.' 68 The history of the
trial of John Peter Zenger or the trials under the Fugitive Slave Act
may be recounted. '69 The anecdotal approach is less likely to raise ob-
jections by the prosecution or to cause the trial judge to sustain an ob-
jection than where the lawyer attempts to tell the jury directly that they
should nullify.
CONCLUSION
The law and the practice surrounding civil disobedience issues are
dynamic. Where criminal cases involving civil disobedience are tried,
166. This is the practice in North Carolina notwithstanding the jury instructions. See SUpra
note 147.
167. 473 F.2d 1113. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
168. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670). See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
169. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
At the trial of Bruce Baechler in federal district court North Wilkesboro, North Carolina in
1974, the evidence was uncontested that on his eighteenth birthday, the defendant walked into his
draft board and announced that he would not register. Prosecuted for failure to register, his de-
fense consisted of testimony about his Quaker background and lifetime of peace witness, as well
as some statements about his opposition to the Vietnam war. During closing argument, Baechler's
lawyer told the jury about the Penn and Zenger cases. The prosecuting attorney protested that
counsel was arguing nullification, but the trial judge overruled the objection, even though he
expressed open hostility toward the defendant. The only basis for the ruling seemed to be the
customary latitude for storytelling afforded counsel in closing argument. After deliberating for
nine hours, the jury found the defendant guilty. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. United
States v. Baechler, 509 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1974).
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they present a challenge to lawyers, judges, and prosecutors. The op-
tions for lawyers and clients in their relationships and for strategies of
defense are unlimited and the lawyer should be careful not to overlook
any possible defenses.
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